Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.

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Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Koen Jochmans Berrnard of Cambridge Verified email at cam.

New citations to this author.

Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: The Economics of Contracts: Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. Contraxts information in insurance: It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: The system can’t perform the operation now.

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Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries.

Journal of Political Economy 3, Email address for updates. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Is your work missing from RePEc?

My profile My library Metrics Alerts. This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar. Search for items with the same title. Estimating preferences under risk: This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Does fertility respond to financial incentives? Journal of the Econometric Society, Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: New articles by this author. Here is how to contribute. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own.

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Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? The economics of contracts: Articles Cited by Co-authors.


Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations

The following articles are merged in Scholar. Verified email at columbia.

This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 Econoimcs of Economics, Columbia University.

The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Articles 1—20 Show more.

The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard.